How Bush is empowering the Muni Wifi IPcom Revolution

It is a great and delicious irony that the tax cuts Bush rammed through in his first term, for the benefit his wealthy benefactors and corporate sponsors, are one of the key driving forces behind the municipal wireless IPcom movement that is about to gore the protected oxen of the telecom incumbents. The unintended consequences will be revolutionary in ways none of us can yet imagine. How so, you ask?

Consider that the tax cuts for the top 5% of the population and the mega corporations, combined with other budget recklessness, have slashed the flow of federal dollars to the states and then from the states to their respective cities and towns. As a result, the budgets of a great many cities and towns, with their increasing expenses and falling revenues, are in dire straights. And they are finding it almost impossible to raise real estate taxes to bridge the gap. So what do do to escape from this trap between a rock and a hard place?

Now consider the Chambers of Commerce that are very unhappy at they way the telecom giants have been exploiting them while taking them for granted.

Both groups are eager for a real choice that will improve services they can benefit from and at the same time cut the costs of their communications budgets. Both groups are discovering the many advantages offered by modern IPcom when compared to last century's Telecom. Both groups are also discovering that their peers in other countries have wider and more attractive choices than we have here at home. And both groups are discovering that they can, in fact, implement an IPcom strategy quite easily on their own. They are also discovering that cost savings from moving from Telecom to IPcom can pay for a muni wireless project in a few short years.

Today, the choice between old Telecom and new IPcom is clear and real. And we the people, when given the democratic power to choose what is best for us as we see it, are overwhelmingly chosing IPcom -- as the Muni Wireless explosion clearly demonstrates. The peoples' choice, no longer controlled by the Telecom incumbents, terrifies them. Why? Because if we the people chose IPcom, all of the business models locked to the old Telecom model fail. Can the old Telecom buggy whip makers transform themselves into modern IPcom services and content providers?

What is also happening is that we are seeing, across many domains, the adoption of the first mile out from the home model replacing the old last mile in from the center. IPcom sees the home as being the point of origin and the locus of choice, and thus power radiating out from the home. The old Telecom model, with the control of choice resident in the center to maximize profits on products delivered to the target home at the end of the last mile, is failing.

To see this, consider a home owner who buys a big, flat screen, hi-def TV home theater system for several thousand dollars. The choice is now in the home as to when, where, and how to view "product", that may even be free, produced by anyone, anywhere, on any topic with out restrictions imposed by governments or corporations on content or language. The choice is now in the home as to how best to optimize the return on the investment in home media systems, both for production and for viewing. The choice can no longer be dictated and controlled by the old industrial era producer in the center. That business model is as good as dead.

So we see Sony try to secretly control choice with rootkits clandestinely installed on privately owned personal computers by music CDs. We see the MPAA and RIAA fight tooth and nail to use anti-democratic and anti-innovation contortions of copyright principles to protect the power and profit they once had from the control of choice. We see the movie theater business fading away as they no longer control viewing choices. We see broadcast TV scrambling to survive in the face of the power of choice slipping from their hands. We see the Main Stream Media, with readership declining, very substantially challenged for "authority and reputation" by the new choices offered by text, audio and video "blogs" created at the edges. We see the wheels coming off the Bush political machine and agenda as it becomes ever more apparent that they have lost control of choice and the ability to impose their "story" on the American people, who are now clearly choosing alternative stories.

We are learning that, in the Bush political world of the stern, dogmatic and all knowing father who always knows best, and must not be questioned, the "children" grow up to realize that their worlds are not the same as "father's" and that he actually does not know best about their worlds. The next step is the recognition that Father probably did not even know best about his own world -- in fact, we soon learn that, with our imperfect knowledge, nobody can know best. The humbling realization is that all we can do is do the best we can to know "good enough" to muddle through life's many vagaries, ambiguities, and surprising unknowns. This is why it makes more sense to start at the edge and work our way out in cooperation with our neighbors, our community, each of us dealing as best we can with our local realities. If you can not "know best", then, in the end, any attempt at controlling choice from the center is bound to fail.

As a result of all of this, we are now living through the political, economic, and cultural tumult of the necessary relocation, if we want to preserve our democracy, of the control of the power of choice from its old point of origin in the center of the Telecom world view to its new point of origin: The edge of the network nobody owns and the new IPcom distributed world view.

A Public Relations campaign

As much as I dislike thinking about political campaigns in terms of advertising, marketing, public relations and all that stuff, the P.R. aspect remains very important. Two recent blog entries have helped me rethink my relation to P.R. as it relates to political campaigns.

Richard Edelman asks “Is Public Relations Ready for Discontinous Change?” and Elizabeth Albrycht writes about how ‘Collaboration Requires Contribution’. Both posts bring up important issues for political campaigns that can help make the P.R. aspect of political campaigns more palatable to grassroots activists.

Edelman recommends that “PR should move away from ‘pitching the story’ mentality. We can be part of conversations on line.” It should “Recognize the influence and credibility of blogs” and “Experiment”. As an example, he suggests “We should be working with video clips attached to press materials to make it easier for bloggers in consumer technology to create v-blogs.”

It seems as if this applies strongly to political campaigns. For the sake of our democracy, we must move away from politicians pitching their story to an environment where they become part of conversations. We must return to good old-fashioned ‘retail politics’ and move away from the sound-byte.

Albrycht takes this even further. She says “Both the development of communities and social capital requires reciprocity - the willingness to both take AND give -- to contribute.” She asks, “What do we have to offer to the communities we want to join/build?” Her answer is “If your answer is only ‘information about our company and products’ then you need to head back to the drawing board.” Again, this applies strongly to political campaigns. If the only reason for a campaign website or blog is to provide information about the candidate, then the campaign had better head back to the drawing board. We need to promote greater participation in democracy.

How do we do this? Albrycht goes on to cite McMillan and Chavis’ work on ‘Sense of Community’ [SOC]. “They define SOC as consisting of the following four characteristics: Feelings of membership; … Feelings of influence; … Integration and fulfillment of needs … ; and Shared emotional connection”.

Political campaigns need to learn from the P.R. community how to enter conversations and build community. Otherwise, we will see more emails like this one I received today from a friend who has become disillusioned with a campaign she has been volunteering for:

“I'm still working on the … campaign, although with far less enthusiasm than in the beginning. I look at the web site and wonder what the hell they are thinking. Just like the Kerry campaign, they just don't get it. They talk the talk but that's where it stops. I've given up giving feedback.”

The Internet is providing politicians a chance to re-engage the American people in the political process, and frightening as it may sound on the surface, they can probably learn a lot from forward thinking public relations experts.

Sony and our National Security

Recently, there has been a lot of discussion about Sony's 'rootkit' that they had secretly been installing on computers around the world and the security issues it has raised.

As I read this, I felt compelled to write the following letter to my Congressperson, Chris Shays, who is chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations.

Rep. Shays,

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, I wish to bring your attention to a recent threat to our National Security. Recently, a large international organization initiated an electronic attack on computers around the world, including computers at the Department of Defense.

Through the distribution of audio CDs, they secretly installed software allowing them to gain and maintain access to the infected computers. The issue is starting to be discussed in the mainstream press, for example at Wired (http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,69601,00.html ) and the Washington Post (http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/11/the_bush_admini.html ).

I would urge the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations to fully investigate this electronic attack and take actions against the large international organization to assure that our country remains safe from such attacks.

Techno Utopians and the Revolt Against Science

After watching the films Connections [James Burke], Pandora's Box and The power of Nightmares [both by Curtis Adams for the BBC], as well as The Fog of War [Errol Morris], I have this strange feeling that what we are experiencing today in American politics is a deep and angry backlash at the failures and bill of goods sold to us by techno utopians who had the unbridled hubris to think they could be Masters of the Universe. It does not matter if they worked at Gosplan in the USSR or for RAND in the USA. Fundamentally they were all techno utopians who got it wrong at great cost.

As Irving Kristol says in Power of Nightmares, the Liberals have no explanation as to why President Johnson and RAND did not produce a Great Society and End Poverty. They also have no apologies for their failures.

Of course it should be noted that today’s Neoconservatives, who also can never be wrong and thus must presume that their knowledge is perfect, are making the exact same mistake. It is certain that they will reap the same whirlwind.

Until the Liberals and Democrats can first acknowledge these failures and apologize for them, the Right will run amok with its anti-science. What we need is some fresh thinking that is able to embrace science and technology with humility, respect for the impossibility of perfect knowledge, and an honest acceptance of the existence of mystery. It is past time to move beyond the approaches of FDR's years and the far right's Cold War use of FEAR as an organizing principal. We will only succeed if we stop looking in the rear view mirror and tackle the future head on. FDR is dead. The Cold War is over. Long live a new and confident Liberalism -- now to invent it.

I recommend viewing the films I cited above for a deeper and more detailed analysis of this history. One the curious things is that these films are not easy to find and view. Curtis Adams’ “The Power of Nightmares”, for example, was never broadcast in the US and the film version has never been distributed. Why?

You can also find more on my views on our need for more science in the post on Greater Democracy:

We need a lot more Science to Survive and Thrive

In today’s world, where long histories of human errors and ignorance compound and amplify the already difficult situations created by natural events, such as hurricanes, earth quakes, mud slides and so forth, what are we to do? Part of the answer is simply that we need a great deal MORE science, not less, if we want to survive and thrive in the 21st century.

Consider also that very many of us today share a yearning for a more satisfying "whole life". I suspect a majority of us are deeply dissatisfied with the empty life offered by hyper consumerism and celebrity madness required, it appears, by the processes of mass production with its dependence on mass markets. This dissatisfaction takes many forms. It also makes some of us very defensive and leads to lashing out and other regrettable behaviors, greed, looting and even terrorism of many sorts, for example.

------- snip

I can also recommend George Clooney’s new film on Edward R. Murrow: Good Night & Good Luck. Bracing and very timely. Note at the end of the film the footage of President Eisenhower defending habeas corpus as a fundamental building block of American democracy.

War Among the Democrats

By: Dana Blankenhorn

This is another one of my political analyses. Please go elsewhere for tech bloggie goodness.

Clueless Washington analysts feel that the Bush Administration’s fall from grace means we have to sit through years before we’re delivered anything interesting.

The real battle, in fact, starts now.

Democrats today are split much as Republicans were 40 years ago. Back then the split was between the “establishment” party which had fought a rear-guard action against the New Deal for a generation, and a new more aggressive “conservative movement,” symbolized first by Barry Goldwater and, after his defeat, by the actor Ronald Reagan, who had placed him in nomination. (Note that the movement was so far down in 1965 its spokesman wasn’t even an office-holder.)

But the fight on the right was really about money, and how to get it. The “establishment” got its money from Wall Street, and the Fortune 500. The “movement” got its money from individuals – some rich, some more Justin Dart and John Olin, the “New Right” leaned on a new technology, direct mail, and on direct mail’s black magician, Richard Viguerie.

The “establishment’ party dealt with interests, pushing back on behalf of industries allied with it – defense, banking, manufacturing -- trying to cobble together temporary majorities by seeking the political center. Eisenhower did it, and the Party of Washington felt this was the only way. Democrats have recently been through the same thing with Bill Clinton, an accomodationist decade led, if not by a war hero, then at least by a foot soldier in the war-against-the-war.

The GOP “movement” party of the 1960s dealt with issues, because that’s where its money came from. It wasn’t important to win, in fact the issue was more valuable than victory. Rhetoric meant more than results. The issue gave you someone to hate, a focus for your anger. It was the big donors, and their big causes (cut government, kill Communists) who came first.

Back to today. The Democratic “establishment” party is based in Washington, and it, too, gets its money from special interests. Trial lawyers, Hollywood, insurance companies, investment bankers.

Then there is a “movement” party, sometimes called the Netroots, born in the wake of the Iraq conflict around the candidacy of Howard Dean.

To many there aren’t real ideological differences between these parties. That’s the mistake.

As before, the difference starts with money. Dean operates from the bottom up, the “establishment” from the top-down.

And that’s where the establishment is now attacking Dean, through the money issue. Never mind that Dean now chairs the DNC. (Goldwater ran with GOP party chairman William Miller.) Loyalty to faction means more in American politics than loyalty to party. Lobbyist Vic Fazio, a former Congressman, complained to The Washington Post that the Democrats are being out fund-raised 2-1.

It would be a valid complaint but for two facts. First, Fazio conflates corporate soft money with hard money figures. Second, Dean’s fund-raising is in fact a record for the party – it’s just that the moneymen of Bush have gone to Caligulan heights lately. (It should also be noted that a million from 10,000 people brings you 10,000 votes, while a million from 1 brings you 1.) The charge, however, resonated throughout the blogosphere.

On “Meet the Press” this week, Dean answered the charge, noting that the party will have operatives in all 50 states next year, that it will have plenty of money, and that the key will be having a message, which he then defined. Rhetoric will be under Dean’s control, just as it was under that of the New Right a generation ago.

Underneath all this is a concerted attempt by the establishment party to shut-out Deanlike candidates. You can see this in Illinois’ 6th Congressional district, where Christine Cigelis, who got 44% of the vote against longtime Republican incumbent Henry Hyde through netroots support last year, suddenly faces a primary challenge from the money party’s Tammy Duckworth, an Iraq veteran.

All this talk about money, however, ignores the real issue differences between the two parties.

You can see that most clearly when you get to issues of technology. The “establishment” party supports industry, the phone and cable companies, Apple Computer, Hollywood. Dean-ocrats are users. They stand for Fair Use, for open source, for WiFi.

Dean-ocrats should not expect a level playing field, if history is any guide.

Let’s go back to 1966 again. Throughout America movement conservatives won races for state legislatures, for school boards, and for other down-ballot offices. But what did the Time cover on the election show? Nearly all the candidates displayed were moderates -- Edward Brooke of Massachusetts , Charles Percy of Illinois among them. Governor-elect Reagan was pushed into a corner.

Even after conservatives won back the White House, the policies of Richard Nixon were strictly leftist. It was Nixon who passed the Clean Air Act, remember, Nixon who appointed Harry Blackmun to the Supreme Court, and Nixon who opened the door to China.

But in the long run it was Nixon’s rhetoric and political attitudes that resonated, because this was the rhetoric, and these were the attitudes, of his followers. The Bush problem in 2005 is that the rhetoric is now so divorced from reality that it doesn’t resonate, just as Lyndon Johnson’s call to the Great Society and Cold War began to fail in 1965.

There are important lessons here. Nixon’s nomination, remember, represented a compromise between the 1968 party’s establishment (Rockefeller) and conservative (Reagan) wings. Even in 1976, Reagan was unable to wrest the nomination from establishment, appointed President Gerald Ford.

But throughout this period, starting in 1966, movement conservatives rose within Republican ranks. Power is never given, it is only seized, even within a political party.

It was 15 years from now, in historical terms, before the New Right really came to power.

Can the Internet accelerate that for the Deanocrats? Can they really wait until 2020?

Personally, I hope not. That’s why the current battles are so important.

Reflections on nature & extent of India-Pakistan détente

Professor Dr. Farooq Hassan [1]
(Synopsis of address given at The Taj to SAPRA Delhi, 22 October, 2005)

I feel very privileged to address today this exclusive gathering of Indian intellectuals in this renowned center of thinking SPARA, India Foundation. It is an honor indeed to be invited by your renowned Center of advanced studies dealing with research on the countries of Asia. I thank you Sir and am most grateful for your gracious hospitality extended to me since my arrival in Delhi. I wish to particularly thank Indranil Banerjie who has kindly coordinated this visit and is also extended my deepest appreciation.

I will be talking today on the status and nature of the current state of détente in India –Pakistan relations and the possible consequences of the US foreign policy on this process. The Sub-Continental politics for half a century has been such that it has demoralized the expectations of many who have hoped for peace while unfolding often serious events of far reaching military and strategic implications. However, since the last year, on account of the analysis given hereinafter, a dynamics has been placed in motion which is headed hopefully towards a more predictable and stable period of friendly relations between the two bigger countries of this region, India and Pakistan.

But the period of the current state of optimism, if not euphoria, is geared towards a time frame which may be not indefinite and circumscribed by eventualities of a political nature from abroad or regional in character from factors within South Asia. From amongst the possibilities that can impact upon this evolution are primarily, though not exclusively, connected with the US foreign policy towards this region. From within the South Asian context itself, the matters to be considered are more complex and are directly relatable to the domestic’s politics of these two countries; these factors are later analyzed in this presentation today. First of all, it would be helpful to focus our attention to the relevant issues connected with the present state of this détente in South Asia. After this matter has been briefly examined we will the look at the prospects of the US political developments connected with this region and their possible impact on the current South Asian political scene.

Détente in South Asia: Nature and Complexity

In April 2003 Premier Vajpayee made his initial diplomatic overture of friendship to Pakistan. Since then clearly matters between the two nuclear armed neighbors have steadily improved. In respect of many public related matters of interest there has been substantial progress. In matters pertaining to art, sports, law or journalism, there has been tremendous improvement, even high level of cordiality witnessed between the peoples of the two countries. Some were therefore encouraged to say that the in the Cricket matches played between the countries in Pakistan in earlier part of 2004 it was indeed the realization of “friendship series”.

As barely two years ago the armies of the two nations stood eyeball to eye to eyeball along hundreds of miles of their frontiers, this is surely a most welcome state of affairs. There is no gainsaying the fact that were the present dynamics, both at the public and governmental level, to stay the course, it would add to the happiness and prosperity of the teeming millions of peoples of both countries. Terms at “ public” and at the “governmental” levels have been advisedly used by me.. There is no doubt in my mind that the people to people contact now being strengthened will grow. This is what I mean by public contact. The more difficult and uncertain inquiry is to correctly predict the quality and extent of expected progress at the “governmental” levels between Islamabad and Delhi.

The ultimate question in analyzing our responses to such an inquiry is to see how far all that is now in evidence is for real and expected to endure the vicissitudes of time and political dynamics of both international and domestic proportions? Here the important question would be to identify which of the two governments fundamentally wants substantial and a real détente? For if both want a state of real friendship to emerge then no problem should theoretically arise, as bilateralism is the key to the success of any genuine betterment of relations.

Although I had visited nearly 130 countries in the world only recently I had my first chance to visit India when I came to address an international conference at the JNU in early 2004. I must confess at realizing, happily I might add, that in the fields that fundamentally matter to states and to people, Constitutional governance, education and national policies towards intellectual pursuits, Indian attitudes and philosophy is at par with the highest levels for such activities anywhere. In hospitality I found my hosts to be both gracious and most attentive to our smallest needs. But where I witnessed the most glaring difference from Pakistan is in adherence to our cherished societal mandates: respectful to those older than oneself, deference to intellect and a continuous predilection towards humility and self-effacement. Indeed in acknowledgement of these facets of Indian life, I publicly wrote in one of my op-ed pieces [2] recently that it is not the possession of nuclear weapons that make and count towards the strength of a country but its adherence to the rule of law that does so. [3] In particular I observed:

“While those in Islamabad go on harping about Pakistan’s invincibility because of Dr. Qadeer, few have the courage to admit our political backwardness, vis-à-vis for instance India, in constitutional evolution under which even the courts, let alone those in other institutions of state, are too happy to agree that on some medieval perceptions of “state necessity” Constitutions can be torn asunder at any time by a local military commander.” [4]

Herein lays, in my view, the genesis of the answer to the question of whether the current detente is for real and will last or not. Whether harmony and reconciliation is achieved and is far reaching in effect is in my view entirely dependent on the relevant characteristics of the two states. I may now briefly proceed to analyze these essential component constituents of the countries.

Let me start with India. It is not merely the largest working but successful democracy in the world today. Its state institutions, particularly its Executive, Legislature and its Judiciary work within their allotted constitutional spheres. I have never seen its Army being described as an “institution of state”. It has many large minorities and has resultantly difficult problems. There are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan. Minorities have asserted, at times rightly in my view that they have suffered. Broadly speaking, therefore, India’s problems emanating from the diversity of cultural and religious beliefs and practices amongst its hundreds of millions of peoples is a matter which is evident in all societies that have multiplicity of ethnicities and religions in its fold amongst it citizens.

The “core” issue of divergence between the two neighbors, according to the Pakistani Government, is that Kashmir. Geographically most of this State is in Indian physical control since the creation of either country. [5] India has witnessed recently a booming economy and out sourcing by many giant multinationals in its Bangalore region has made it a thriving prospect for the leading financial houses of the world. In addition to the information technology this region has made astounding strides towards excellence in the manufacture of advanced biomedicines. This is amply reflected by growth rate of over 8% in its economy. This is amongst the highest in the world. [6]

Regrettably Pakistan, on the other hand, has most unsettled political processes in evidence, a non-existent observance of peoples’ rights, weak state institutions including judiciary, and an over-bearing and politically minded army leadership that has repeatedly indulged in coups d’ etat. [7] In the economic domain, the decline in international interest rates and the after effects of 9/11 have combined to produce a bulging reservoir of foreign exchange. However, industry and investment are stagnant, and with inflation rising, poverty has actually increased from where it stood in 1999 when Musharraf took over.

So if the main irritants between the two countries were to hypothetically disappear, or become a non-issue for the time being at least anyway, what immediate and long term affects the countries would encounter?

As far as India is concerned, politically it has to genuinely cherish such a goal. Not only has an absence of tension allowed her to focus her attention to shift from being constantly on the look out for ad hoc political and military actions in its North Western frontiers, to something more constructive. It can help India considerably in dealing perhaps meaningfully with its large Muslim minority. In addition its economy will clearly benefit by a decrease in its non-development expenditures.

There is a school of thought, nevertheless, that articulates that the new Indian initiative was based on pragmatic grounds of domestic political compulsions at the relevant time. The BJP led Administration was cognizant of the fact that apprehensions existed in the rest of the Indian population, particularly in the Muslims of its staunch right wing religious sympathies. As such to negate the perception and indeed the impression that it had anything to do with the recent Gujarat riots in which 2000 Muslim reportedly perished or to deny the Congress of its traditional large Muslim electoral support, that Mr. Vajpayee and his think tank decided to turn a leaf in its relations with Pakistan. In sum, according to this view, the changed Indian attitude was fundamentally guided by the electoral priorities that the BJP was then faced with and not with any deeper considerations emanating from a sense of improving relations with Islamabad per se.

Personally, for reasons articulated below, I do not think that this thinking is sound. Had such been the case, Mr. Vajpayee could never have come to Lahore in January 1999 to then go to the Minar–a-Pakistan and accept the nationhood of this country. Even otherwise the language or its tenor used by him in talking of Pakistan had never been one of feelings of animosity. I do not recall any rhetoric where such an attitude was visible. More importantly, however, in the last three years in the aftermath of 9/11 international developments, India never used from her perspective, any issue that could have complicated Musharraf’s political troubles in domestic affairs. After all Musharraf's volte-face on the point of Islamabad’s long standing support of the Taliban or Pakistan’s support of “fundamentalists” were powerful issues that could have been exploited. Similarly Mr. Vajpayee did not utilize available reality of Pakistan Government’s denial of the Constitutional rights of its own people. After all such an argument was used in 1970 when the then Bangladesh crisis initially arose

I may hasten to add that in Pakistan most people still do not think that the description of “fundamentalist” should be used in a pejorative sense. Perhaps a majority of the Islamic populations also would be of the same view. However, there is no gainsaying the awareness that as a term of art as used by the Western press of late, this phrase does convey since 9/11 some element of aggression or rigidity in certain sections of the Muslim population’s world wide.

An important factor in support of this perspective that Mr. Vajpayee had been quite upfront about this new attitude relates to the Pakistani attack on the Kargill in early 1999. The Indian Premier never used this military and strategic misadventure reportedly undertaken by Islamabad at Musharraf’s calling. In more ways than one, that could have been done.

Militarily, one would think as some experts maintain, it was a serious blow to the technical expertise of the country’s armed forces planning and operations’ capabilities. Diplomatically this disastrous misadventure theoretically was even more embarrassing for the then civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. [8] This tragic episode, in which Pakistan eventually suffered heavy causalities, could have proved most embarrassing for the military junta in Pakistan when it was itself in power after October 1999. All powers, after all, of any relevance in the country since October 1999 have remained with Musharraf. In the aftermath of post 9/11 international thinking, such state behavior by Pakistan could have been considered most reckless. I am thus of the clear view that Mr. Vajpayee had been substantially sincere in approaching his country’s relations with Islamabad de novo with a view to the establishment of genuine cordiality between the two countries by not raising any of such issues publicly

Let us now take a look at Pakistan and the available theoretical and practical considerations to evaluate her bona fides in the current political progress. Broadly speaking most people in Pakistan want peace and harmony with India. In recent times during the tenure of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif ostensibly genuinely impressive steps were taken to improve qualitatively Islamabad relations with Delhi. But these modalities of diplomatic activity were hardly encouraged by the military leadership. Indeed an important Minster of the Bhutto Government was suspected of having passed on to India the lists of Pakistanis helpers in the Easter pat of Punjab!

The most relevant matter to be comprehended in this context is the realization of Pakistan’s considerable political clout of its armed forces leadership in the country’s political affairs. Further, the military prowess of this “institution” of the State is, by Pakistani standards supposedly impressive. Pakistan’s raison d ’etre of possessing such a substantial and large military establishment’s is her professed fear of India. [9] If ex hypothesi, such a state of affairs were to emerge that such fears become irrelevant to be realistically visualized, then one would be hard pressed to explain the present size or maintenance of such a large army and its consequential expenditures that is a huge burden on the national exchequer?

My point is simple. How can the leadership of the size of the army that Pakistan possesses, demolish the very basis that enables it to emerge with a pre-eminent position in the state power structure? With the meager resources of the country being largely taken up to support such a huge establishment, Islamabad has already, on numerous occasions, been advised by world monetary and financial institutions to decrease and cut down its non-development expenditures. With even Parliament being unable to scrutinize these extra-ordinary expenditures, it is a matter that surely needs some national scrutiny to provide, if possible, the poor masses some much need revenues.

Vital human and civil sectors of the country, dealing with such matters as health, education and communication are already receiving less than 3% of the total budgetary allocations of the country. Poverty per se is the largest source of unstable social conditions and the constantly deteriorating law and order situation that generally essentially prevails in the country. Yet the country we are told is “compelled” to maintain this non-development source of persistent drain on its meager resources because the “vital interests” so demand! There being no institutional watchdog in the country to question such omnibus fiats, the thinking public and the intelligentsia has just to learn to just live with it.

In understanding this matter it is also crucial to keep in mind the tremendous political significance that the army leadership in the country has acquired by the sheer power of its resources in the body politic of the country. Is it realistically possible that any army leadership can relinquish all this bounty and largesse willingly? [10] Surely if the perceived casus belli with India were to hypothetically disappear or put in abeyance as a result of the current détente, the scenario I am envisaging would have to be faced by any military establishment in Islamabad, which it would rather not.

As such it is not a mere coincidence that in the last dozen years on two important occasions when the purely civilian leadership tried to increase its level of friendship with India, the army leadership reacted with suspicion and distrust. [11] We cannot also be unmindful of the reality that at the time when the two previous major wars between the two countries took place the army leadership had the reins of political control in Islamabad.

Since history is the surest guide to fore tell the expected future course of evolution, one has to carefully but with some degree of surety predict, that despite Musharraf’s overtures of everlasting friendship to Mr. Vajpayee (and now to Mr. Manmohan Singh), when the crunch time arrives, the “present Pakistani Government” which I think is clearly that of a military junta, would not be as swift in moving ahead as some may think the present course of evolution may demand. One has still to know, for instance, for sure what really happened in Kargill in 1999? Was it a misadventure indulged in by the civilian Pakistani Government under Prime Nawaz Sharif’s orders? Or, as has been hinted at by many including President Clinton, that it was the result of the thinking of only General Musharraf? [12]

I am, therefore, of the view that as long as Pakistan does not have a validly elected Government works under the Constitution, inter-governmental cordiality presently seen involving Pakistan is more an outcome of opportunistic outlook by Islamabad rather than a genuinely felt need of the history of this age.

Recent history is fully in accord with these articulations. Deducible normative behavioral pattern of Pakistani motivations in approaching the current détente leaves one with such regrettable conclusions. I am further also fortified in making this qualitative assessment on the basis of available incidental circumstantial, yet concrete evidence, to which I may now briefly refer.

For example is it not surprising that despite the present climate of high good will, all official TV channels of and from India are still officially forbidden to be seen anywhere in Pakistan. These programs cannot be broadcast by Cable operators in Pakistan by specific banning edicts of the Musharraf regime? Why? Is it not surprising that in the 9 PM daily news bulletin of the Official Pakistan Television (PTV) ( called the Khabernama) India-bashing is still very much an integral part of the Pakistani news? [13] Does it not prove, as I see it, that the present Musharraf regime is keeping the anti-India rhetoric very much alive? What is the purpose of al this? Is the Pakistani official electronic media to be used along with its dissemination apparatus, if a “need” arises? Conversely preventing the Pakistani public from seeing what officially the Indian channels are openly disseminating is tantamount to keeping them attuned merely to the PTV sermonized broadcasts?

Pakistan’s population is composed of decent, very warm and intelligent people. They would like noting better than to know the truth about India, its cultures and its people. In arts and mattes of entertainment already Pakistani public just adores the high quality presentations of movies and the Indian cinema. Well known Indian artists and figures of the cinema are already household words in Pakistan. Similarly artists of note from Pakistan have performed with much credit and fame in India. There is thus much to know that is prevented by the Islamabad military junta by putting an embargo on the right to information of the people of Pakistan by not allowing free broadcast of Indian news and current affairs programs. Quite plainly this is due to the basic psychological insecurity of the military based regime in Islamabad having never been constitutionally elected to do what it purports to be doing in the manner aforesaid.

I think another reality in this context is the fact that I believe that that the present military regime fervently wants to hide from the 140 million people of Pakistan the vibrant presence of democratic values in India. This is so for two reasons; -

The fact is that we have currently no such representative system in evidence in Pakistan. Information of India and about its governance system would prove may be somewhat embarrassing to an unrepresentative Administration still essentially controlled by the army in such a irresponsible legal misconception that the country’s “Prime Minister” refers to his Army Chief, clearly one of his subordinates as his “boss”. Seeing that the army generals in India are nothing more than ordinary servants of the states in uniform, may provide some food for thought is too uncomfortable a proposition to be easily accommodated in Islamabad.

That it prima facie legally and morally weakens Islamabad’s case in the domestic and international fora for a plebiscite in Kashmir. If the people of Pakistan cannot have a duly and fairly elected Administration in the country, a case can hardly be made of having one in Kashmir through the same process discredited by the military regime in the country itself.

Therefore, it is most regrettable and sad that the people of Pakistan are still being dished out blatantly the supposed benefits of Stalinist type ideas of governance through the state run and controlled media. It is a form of rulership that all military governments in Pakistan find most difficult not to extol and eulogize. Who can find parallels in constitutional history of parliamentary system that Islamabad had on 25th of June last year (2004) three premier s standing in rostrum simultaneously? Premier Jamali despite commanding the support of majority had been replaced by Shujhat Hussain, who was to replaced by Shaukat Aziz thus becoming the first prime mister in waiting in the entire annals of Parliamentary history!

Such devices are, however, as faulty as they are bereft of any meaningful voice of reality. People in Pakistan, as in India may be poor and even largely uneducated. But they know the basic truths about their own governors. No amount of stopping the reaching of Indian TV stations can convince the people in Pakistan that non- elected Presidents and one man tailor made Constitutions are democratic. [14]

Thus a question arises: why did the Musharraf regime, manifestly after the 9/11 occurrence in the US, go so concertedly after a patching up mission with the Vajpayee Administration?

This fact is based on a realization by Islamabad, I believe, on two important considerations. However , before we articulate these two major motivations it might be helpful, however, to initially analyze the ethos of the prevalent factual situation. At the time of the 9/11 tragedies because of Musharraf’s coup of October 1999, Pakistani Government of the present military junta stood internationally ostracized. Two important points need to be mentioned here.

First, the manifest absence of an elected Government in Pakistan at that time led to Pakistan’s suspension from the Commonwealth. That suspension was in effect until the spring of 2004. This revoking of this suspension occurred, as on 25th December, 2003 Musharraf made a “promise” to the people of Pakistan on national TV. This had to be done by him since in January 2004 the SAARC heads of Government meeting in Islamabad in January 2004, was about to take place. It would have embarrassed Islamabad and indeed other participants to be sitting with a military led junta. Thus out of political necessity rather than a change of heart this promise was essentially made to restore the Civilian rule by not remaining simultaneously the President as well as the Chief of the Army by the end of the year. As later events are proving this “promise” was nothing more than a time gaining maneuver.

Similarly, Washington had imposed fairly crippling sanctions on Islamabad under various laws since Octber1999. This was a mandatory legal consequence as a result of the violation of the human rights clauses under which the US cannot aid any country under its Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 if there is the absence of a civilian government in a country. [15] Similarly, the European Union had passed Resolutions criticizing the assumption of power of Musharraf. [16]

As such the Musharraf regime was in a literal sense desperate not to further antagonize India since it could not afford a confrontation of a political kind with both the secular forces [17] and the religious ones led by the Jamait–a-Islami (JI) and Jamai-Ulema-a-Pakistan (JUI) as well from across the eastern borders of the country. It was in a political sense a necessity that persuaded the military establishment to become “friendlier’ with India to ward off any possibility of becoming more actively engaged in diverse fronts than could be handled at one time.

The two main reasons that certainly prompted Musharraf to cultivate India in this manner are therefore: -

The realization that by preventing India from agitating against the military government’s domestic denial of civil liberties, it would gain at least time for undertaking more damage control measures for maintaining its domestic hegemony over political power in the country.

To ensure that in the much-changed international political environment, Pakistan got the necessary American support for its domestic agenda despite being admittedly a non-democratic Government. [18] Elections were held in Pakistan in October 2002 but with such extensive state control mechanisms and manipulation as well as under such changed constitutional provisions that no parliamentary system in the world can possibly freely function. No international entity really that matters, such as the Commonwealth, accepts that these elections have resurrected the civilian nature of the government in Islamabad.

The realities of the present détente, therefore, are such that while India would like this peace process to stay the course, it depends more on the political fortunes of the present military regime in Pakistan whether in fact that would continue to do so. The process might well continue if the current domestic political scene of Pakistan and regional status quo somehow maintains itself. But the chances of the continuity of the Musharraf regime as it presently functioning are somewhat less than genuinely predictable.

Thus intergovernmental relations are thus likely to maintain their current pace and intensity in the immediate coming months. If, however, the present Islamabad military junta’s hold on power is threatened, the foremost casualty would be the rupture of the current level of cordiality with India.

But one factor over which the Musharraf regime cannot probably reverse the process now underway is the public participatory evolution that has now emerged as a result of the current enhanced peoples’ contact. On account of a bold and forthright policy orientation India has freely given its visa to numerous Pakistan organizations, delegations, and individuals. Much has been said about and by those visiting India back in Pakistan. As such there has emerged in truth a climate of high respect, indeed affection, for the Indian public in those who live in Pakistan. I had, for instance never visited India in my life until earlier this year. But since then having witnessed the vibrant dedication to a regime of rule of law, something highest in my priorities, I am the first to publicly acknowledge, the real genius of the Indian system in many of my writings and op ed columns.

I may now turn to some recent political developments as they deserve some comment. As these emergent factors have intimate connection with the subject of this script, I may now briefly advert to them.

On 19th April 2004, Musharraf visited Lahore and held long and exclusive meetings with the Punjab Chief Minister, Governor and with many elected members of the ruling party from the largest Province of Pakistan. It appears that he had at that time initially set his eyes on becoming the political head of the “official” or “sarkari version” of the Muslim League. This brand of this party is a collection of the same individuals that belonged formerly to Nawaz Sharif.

This group of patent opportunists has been handily available to his three hand picked “successors” by Musharraf in rapid succession as premiers, namely, Zafarullah Jamali, Shujahat Hussain and now Shaukat Aziz. Without any meeting of their Central Working Committee, they accepted these manifestly “appointed” individuals, as their Leader of the House in the Parliament. This is the surest evidence why we have only a facade of democracy in Pakistan crudely set up as a fake front of a military junta. For no working democracy can possibly “elect’ three different individuals in three months as the leaders of the party

Without question Jamali, publicly referred to the General as repository of all power and wisdom in the country. He happily extended his full support to the Musharraf “regime”. But he still had to go. Why? Because he remained by background a “politician”. Musharraf could not even apparently tolerate him since he wanted a complete rank “outsider” from the domain of politics to ensure the incumbent premier’s utter political impotence.

When prime ministers are changed without any formal meeting or consent of even the political parties they commanded at least theoretically to become the leaders of the lower House in the first place, it is impossible to call the system parliamentary or democratic. In my view this “regime”, therefore, howsoever labeled remains essentially a military junta led administration

Despite being a Prime Minister in a parliamentary system Jamali had no qualms in accepting the role of the second fiddle while formally running the Federal Government under Article 91 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Musharraf’s apparent and overt ambitions of entering the political process as head of a political party of the country had to be furthered by a straight forward dictation to the politically fragile Muslim League. This was done by replacing unceremoniously both Jamali and his “successor” Shujahat Hussain within a period of three months. He had one Shuakat Aziz, an unknown banker from New York in the employment of Citibank as one of its several vice-presidents until his recall to Pakistan by General Musharraf in 1999 after his coup, assume the high political office of the country’s Premier in August 2004.

A brief look at the new Pakistani premier may speak more eloquently on the terribly sad state of the character of the Pakistani politics, than any commentary by an “expert”. It is least surprising to those who follow Pakistani political milieu that the current Prime Minster of Pakistan had no home or “permanent residence” in the country. Neither had he lived in Pakistan since about the last forty years. That is why for election to the Parliament a “residence” had to be found for him! This search was extended from Sindh to the Frontier Provinces. Eventually a constituency was found for him from Attack, a remote area on the borders of Punjab and Frontier provinces.

The “appointment” of an utter non politician, and for all practical and legal purposes a “foreigner”, is the best evidence that Musharraf changed his mind from becoming the titular head of Muslim League to one possessing de facto powers over the Parliament. This was done as such by ensuring his hegemony over the country’s Constitution and by “appointing” an utter non-entity to the exclusive position of the nations’ Prime Minister. No wonder, therefore, that Shaukat Aziz is affectionately called “short-cut Aziz” by sections of the national press who allows General Musharraf to run single handedly all foreign and domestic policy agenda of the country. His job is apparently restricted to running merely the portfolio of that of the Finance Ministry. The other Ministers report to General in the conduct of their official duties. Accordingly, the Parliamentary system, for which we have expressly Articles 91 to Articles 97 of the Constitution give all such authority to the Premier, has been rendered in fact moribund.

Another recent political phenomenon deserving our close notice is the personal ambition of the General keeps his military rank and uniform despite having retired from his service many years ago. After most reluctantly agreeing to step down as Chief of Army in 2004, before the SAARC Conference in Islamabad in January 2004, Musharraf began to renege on this constitutional and moral undertaking given to the people of Pakistan on 25th December 2003. He clearly indicated through several Ministers of the present Government that he be allowed to keep both his current position of Presidency and that of the head of the country’s armed forces beyond the year 2004 [19].

Pakistan’s Parliament eventually enacted a “law” by the Shuakat Aziz led Muslim League Party, to accept him as the Chief of Army in addition to being the President - in clear derogation of the General’s commitment and the express words and spirit of the Constitution. It is the first “representative” institution to accept a serving military general, an ordinary servant of the State, as the country’s President and a part of the legislative process as well.

So since the Opposition did not challenge this measure on the ground that the country’s judiciary was not the appropriate forum after what Musharraf had been doing to the judicial branch of the Republic, it is inevitable that the future of constitutional rule of law remains in peril. [20] With the basic institutions of state held ransom by a military junta, the supremacy of rule of law remains an elusive goal. In this context it deserves to be boldly said that no parliament in the world can possibly do so which the Islamabad National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has done. This is the truest factual commentary on the sad state of democratic functioning in Pakistan presently.

Potentially the impact of these political scenarios do not auger well for Pakistan. If he stays on in uniform, as well as the country’s President, having never been elected, it will result in a gradual increase in political instability in Pakistan. An unstable Pakistan, at a time of rule by a military junta, is the surest recipe for the emergence of a ‘ hostile” policy towards India in times of any crisis, real or fictitious. Musharraf may well believe that by doing so he will be able to ward off or divert, civil and political domestic unrest.

If, on the other hand, the General maintains the present status quo, and hangs on to the political power grabbed by him in 1999 through his coup, the conceivable consequences of such a phenomenon are hardly encouraging vis-à-vis relations with India.

His “unpopularity” level is alarmingly and abysmally low in the country. This is inevitable since he is about to enter the sixth year of his rule in power. In constitutional parlance of Pakistani Supreme Court jurisprudence [21], he remains a “usurper.” Hence, while faced with an increasing crescendo of domestic opposition, he is, more likely than not, to adopt policies on the lines indicated above. Since Machiavelli writings, it has been the opinion of some observers that to divert, control or confuse indigenous discontent, the ruler threatened would likely embark upon a foreign misadventure for patently obvious reasons.

Further, it may be noted, though practically I now discount such a possibility, if Musharraf decides to contest any genuine elections at the behest of “official” Muslim League, he will have to adopt a visibly anti-US stand. This will entail a series of possibilities which are easy to visualize but which may be disastrous for him. Elections are won on different principles than Byzantine maneuverings as a military dictator. To win any type of election in contemporary Pakistan, he would have to eschew policy declarations which are utterly foreign to his recent avowed attitudes towards the US and on Islamic teachings, aptitude and previous conduct while at the helm of affairs in the country.

Further complicating the prospects for Musharraf is his unending vulnerability qua his “justification” for remaining in harness. To set off this constant political liability all the time, and to remain politically viable, he must also say something on Kashmir. He has, though somewhat mutedly of late, therefore still referred to it as the “core issue” between India and Pakistan. Howsoever, he couches his stand on this point, he cannot possibly proceed to adopt any position that may lead to a real solution of this controversy. For if that ever occurred, the size and extent of keeping in line his own military constituency, as already emphasized earlier, will be in question.

In the context of the topic of this address, such far reaching possibilities are hardly encouraging. Regretfully Musharraf, with cosmetic differences dictated by circumstances, is following the exact footprints of the earlier military dictators of Pakistan, Ayub and Yayha. Both, in difficulties of their making, choose to go to war with India and adopted strategies that failed them. As I see it, the statement, some times echoed abroad, about Pakistan being a “failed state” is precisely due to such malefactors in the body politic of Pakistan. For after all, what else would you say about a country that has essentially no Constitution but a system of ad hoc governance at the will of a military commander occupying his own country?

Resultantly it is not impossible to visualize that India too may be driven to a lessening of cordiality as a result of such an evolution from Islamabad. Already Mr. Manmohan Singh’s statements on a number of diverse issues, from cross border terrorism to “demilitarization” of certain parts of Kashmir, as tentatively put forth by Musharraf, have been sharply dismissive of the thoughts on these issues emanating from Islamabad

Another factor furthermore is the slow, yet perceptible, deterioration of Pakistan’s relations with Kabul and indeed with some of the diplomats and military commanders of the US over there. Although the strategic ingredients of this equation (that is Afghanistan/ Pakistan) are fundamentally different, yet, for convenience, Musharraf could easily lump all his difficulties over there in India’s lap. There have been strong verbal public disagreements between the US envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad, and the Foreign Office Spokesman of the Pakistani Government. Both seem to blame each other for what Pakistan is allegedly doing or not doing adjacent to the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition, when the Pakistan Army recently encountered heavy opposition from the local tribesman in Wana in Southern Waziristan, the same Military spokesman said that “foreign hand” in such elements and hostilities could not be “ruled out”

While what this reference to a “foreign hand” implies may be apparently ambivalent, in strategic terms, it can only realistically mean that he was referring to either Afghanistan or India. No other “foreign element” can theoretically be said to be even allegedly involved. Since blaming it on Kabul will be tantamount to hitting at the US interests over there, which presumably Musharraf cannot dare to do, it is inevitable that such allegations are clearly directed against only Delhi. There this is thus strong evidence that when the military junta finds it self hard pressed on account of some failed policy or misadventure, it is the cordiality of goodwill towards India that may be the initial victim.

With Musharraf seriously flawed record against the very concept of Rule of Law he can hardly expect to be in any position to win any non-military establishment support anywhere. [22] All these maneuvers and intrigues alluded to above, within the constitutional dictates of Islamabad Administration, to achieve a perpetuation of the control of all the institutions of the State by the army by Musharraf, cannot but be looked upon with grave suspicions by domestic and international actors dedicated to rule of law.

US Foreign Policy & the peace process

Despite lot of rhetoric to the contrary, it is very doubtful whether President G.W. Bush can stomach such a dictatorship ad infinitum in Pakistan. This “dictatorship formula”, after all, goes against his November 6th, 2003 speech on the Middle East when the American President said he wished the establishment of “genuine democratic Islamic regimes”. This is followed by his 2005 State of Union address when he used the word “democracy” 26 times in the first twenty minutes. This continuity of a military based rule in Pakistan seriously undermines the efforts of the American Administration to create “democracy” in countries where it has extended its hand of support, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is true that, while no one can say that democracy has arrived in such places either, but at least “elections” are being held and their heads of Government are clearly not from the uniformed military in service, like in Myanmar or Islamabad. Most observers think, therefore, that those remarks of the US President were principally directed against Pakistan, rather than Arab or the other two states mentioned of the Middle East.

Looked at from another perspective, in the wake of 9/11, the Bush Administration has followed in the past four years a one dimensional foreign policy in Pakistan. It was to obtain territorial hinterland and periphery topographic support in Pakistan to accomplish its military task against the Taliban in Afghanistan. By one account, written by General Tommy Franks recently, the US had obtained 74 land bases in Pakistan to facilitate its operation in neighboring Afghanistan.

Now, however, matters are certainly in a state of both political and strategic metamorphosis. Having been severely castigated in and beyond the US for having supported dictatorship in the area, Washington may well alter its foreign policy into one of being multidimensional. Post Saddam relentless and ongoing struggles in Iraq and the resurgence of guerrilla activity in Afghanistan has driven home the point that democracies in far flung areas cannot be maintained by armies. That spells, presumably, the end of the monopolistic control that Musharraf had assumed he had over Mr. Bush’s actions in this region. Hopefully, therefore, domestic politics in Pakistan and regional policies of the concerned powers do not allow the continuity of a military rule in Islamabad. This is bad for Pakistan, its people, the regional politics, and creates a whole new kind of uncertainty analyzed above for the Sub-Continent.

As the sole superpower, the US has larger interests in this region to see that relations between India and Pakistan remain on a harmonious footing. The American Government has already described India as “an emerging power”. With Pakistan’s “strategic need” for the US bound to lessen soon enough, and the issue of nuclear proliferation far from closed, as some might wish it to be, there are fair chances, that, despite the pessimistic scenarios alluded to by me, Washington may ensure in Mr. Bush’s second term that the blossoming of tranquil relations between the two countries is not jeopardized by usurpation tendencies of Islamabad’s current military ruler ship. Ambassador Blackwell, the US Ambassador to India, said as much in a recent interview. This newly emerging relationship with New Delhi has already seen the signing of civilian nuclear plans between the two countries, a large qualitative change in terms of strategic planning that India may now undertake for future.

Good relations between India and Pakistan remain long term strategic interests of Washington. Furthermore, from purely an objective perspective, the longevity and quality of any such relationship is dependent on the respect and prevalence of Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Islamabad. [23]

South Asian Ingredients in US Policy

In order to see in a historical context the main thrust of the American foreign policy towards South Asia, a brief look at the evolution of Washington’s interests in this region may be briefly examined.

Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara as far back as 1966 described the essential historical foundational ingredients of the importance of the Sub-Continent to Washington when he said:

“South Asia has become, through a combination of circumstances and geography, a vital strategic area in the present context between the expansionist and non-expansionist power centers. In friendlier hands or as non-aligned states, South Asia can be a bridge between Europe and the Far East and a major physical barrier to the Southward expansion of Red China and the USSR; in hostile hands, it would seal the long term hope of building a free Asian Coalition able to provide counterweight to an expansionist China.” [24]

Clearly many practical and ground realities underscored in this statement have changed since 1966 and are no longer relevant. It is also clear that this view manifestly overstated the importance of this region to the US by giving it an expansive base of significance that never reflected the actual situation to impress upon the Congress the Administration’s needs of that time. Similarly, the perceived threat from the north was also an exaggeration made out for political needs of that Administration. Admittedly, absent also is the presence of any known and substantial natural resources of this region to qualify it per se as a “vital” interest of Washington.

But some important postulates emphasized in this policy statement are still apparently valid as they were in historical terms over thirty years ago. [25] These essential elements in my view being:

1. The emergence of South Asia regional politics in the global geo-politica priorities of the US. [26]

2. The clear intent of the US that this region does not fall under wrong or “hostile hands.” [27] This particularly applies to Pakistan with is nuclear capacity.

3. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism so called in respect of Pakistan and the potential of an electorate siding with it.

4. The rise of India as an economic power house with limitless potential.

5. The potential of India being the largest working democracy in the world compared to the continuity of authoritarianism in Pakistan.

These present basic postulates of the American foreign policy vis-à-vis South Asia are truly reflected in the post 9/11period. The preservation of the status quo remains, in my submission, a paramount objective of the US policies in South Asia. The avoidance of chaos and anarchy in this region are manifestly evident in numerous US declarations made in the last two years. In 2002 and early 2003 when India and Pakistan were looking to conceivably be at war soon, the US duly led the international efforts to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring.

Historical US policy towards: Background

The creation of the new Dominions of India and Pakistan in 1947, witnessed a discord of foreign policies of the new countries. [28] In contrast to India’s growing involvement with many major powers, Pakistan’s links were almost entirely with Washington. But domestic changes in Pakistan, and the Sino-Indian border disputes of the early sixties, altered all that. Initial Indian reaction, which I might call as the ”traditional” approach of Delhi towards coups in general, Prime Minister Nehru rebuked the Pakistan government under General Ayub Khan as “naked military dictatorship”. [29] Although India did not do anything rash, it soon got militarily embroiled with China in border disputes along its northern frontiers. [30] However, because of Anglo-American pressures on Ayub Khan, Pakistan did nothing to add to India troubles at that time. But it did signal,which went unregistered with Pakistan, that Washington would not tolerate any real changing of the ground realities via-a-vis the territorial or political integrity of India by Islamabad.

Pakistan, while keeping itself unconnected with these occurrences, yet realized that both India and China were formidable military powers and that the armed conflicts between them were too close to her frontiers to give her any comfort. [31] While being not unhappy at the ease with which China prevailed in these borders tussles, Islamabad realized that it too had to carefully weigh its options in territorial disputes with India. [32]

Yet such awareness not withstanding, armed conflict between Pakistan and India erupted in 1965. From Washington’s perspective, it signaled a failure of an important element of its foreign policy in the Sub-Continent. Since the early sixties, Washington had attempted to keep a balance between both states by connecting all aid, particularly to Islamabad, by conditioning it to an absence of armed hostilities between them. [33] Since the Vietnam War, the US foreign policy has largely been predicated by a priority to keep Washington aloof from international involvements generally unless it’s vital “security” was threatened. [34]

Current US priorities

With this over-riding policy evaluation in view, we have to now see just how important is the United States to the Sub-Continent? The answer to this inquiry further lies embedded in the responses that we come up with to the following inquiries:

(1) Basic Questions:

Is it vital, as a national security matter that the Sub-Continent, or countries thereof, are not hostile toward Washington? Or is it that the answer lies somewhere in between, that is that the area is important in at last some respects, but as a geographical region that has little of immediate impact on US vital interests? Further, in light of the declared nuclear position of the two major Sub Continental powers, India and Pakistan, does the Sub-Continent acquire automatically a status of permanent vigilance for the US? If so, does it require a similarity of treatment for both these countries from the US? Or is it that it is Pakistan that must be monitored more anxiously? [35] Lastly, what is the significance of the element of so-called “Islamic fundamentalism” in Pakistan’s domestic and external policies and does this issue per se qualitatively tantamount to a “security interest” of Washington? An allied inquiry would be clearly with regard to Pakistan's role in the current US war against terrorism and whether such a role makes the region of “vital strategic interests “ to the US? [36]


There is no simple way to answer all such questions with great precision. This is partly due to the nature of the area. It is also not easy, furthermore, to do so since a number of political developments underlying these concerns are still in process of evolving. This is particularly evident in respect of the last three questions posed above.

It is not within the purview of this work to go into the diverse facets of the war against terrorism alluded to in these questions; however, it is safe to submit that at least as long as the US war against terrorism is perceived to be still on by Washington, Islamabad’s present importance to the US is bound to remain in tact. However, with armed hostilities in Afghanistan assuming a secondary position since the US invaded Iraq in March 2003, it is legitimately arguable that Pakistan’s erstwhile priority niche in the Pentagon’s planning has decreased and will continue to do so. [37]

(2) Immediate US Objectives

Immediately the major US objective has been to prevent from eruption the chaos that could result if there were real hostilities, howsoever caused, between India and Pakistan . Firstly is to prevent the terrifying threat, now clearly receded, of a nuclear confrontation between the countries. Such a horrible scenario can, in theory, arise out of gross mishandling of ongoing political differences. Secondly, is the theory that Islamabad’s possible military and political actions against the religious “fundamentalists”, primarily undertaken at Washington’s behest, could conceivably result in unpredictable domestic and regional upheavals within Pakistan. [38] The Islamabad army junta rejects this eventuality out of hand. However, such a conclusion is obviously self serving and based on ignorance of history. Military juntas world wide are known for their myopia in visions of their own fates.

Whether such causation criteria would stay and maintain its present form is difficult to predict since it is linked with the sustenance of such a phenomenon. [39] The US has come to recognize that through elections it is difficult to completely prevent such possibilities. The prevention of the emergence of political power of religious elements cannot be easily accomplished by elements that would rather see the retention of secular forces remaining in command. Elections in Turkey and Pakistan since 9/11 have amply proved this thesis. Indeed, already evidence is coming to light that, after the initial ousting of the Taliban, US has “lost” some of its zeal and physical control in Afghanistan. [40]

Such noticeable vicissitudes notwithstanding, however, it is high on American priorities that this region can be kept as calm as possible. However, to prevent such chaos from occurring, can the US go as far as it did in Afghanistan? With the most recent developments in Iraq, it is doubtful if this is a serious possibility. Short of actual involvement, though, Washington would do much to prevent such eventualities.

In the current phase of initiatives for peace, both India and Pakistan have been intelligently cognizant of the international realities that exit since 9/11. Both countries are manifestly aware that in a highly charged international atmosphere, it was only prudent that, at least for the time being, the erstwhile attitudes towards each other be put aside for more active peace oriented policies.

There are many cogent reasons for this awareness, but the most obvious one is to keep this region free of direct involvement of outsiders. India’s immediate strategic gain has been to satisfy an old need that Pakistan stop its alleged help to cross border attacks on its people in Kashmir. Publicly admitted to by Pakistan is the fact that behind the scenes the US has been actively assisting this process. [41]

Bush’s war on terrorism, his occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq, are matters and issues on which there is indeed an international debate in evidence. By all accounts no “war” in memory has evinced such world wide opposition, including from within the US. Yet Mr. Bush has also evoked very passionate support in the religious and bible belt regions of the US. He has also obtained by visible means the outright aid of the conservative and right wing elements of the country. As I see it, there has emerged a division on the line of rural and urban populations as well. Well over 70% of the Bible belt overwhelmingly is with President Bush. That is there seems to be a clear division between the conservative and liberal protagonists in the United States.

The overwhelming evidence that exits from past US history of the conduct of its foreign policy is that generally external policies, once in place, are usually maintained by either Party’s Administration since it is usually the “establishment” that has carved out its contours and direction. By this term I mean the bureaucracy, the cumulative advice of the country’s think tanks, and, indeed, of the major economic power houses of the US. This is invariably a long drawn out prognosis of what is the “need” of the US which is made years in advance. Such a policy therefore usually stays in place for foreseeable future.

Having seen that effectuating “imposed” governments are in long run self defeating, the larger US interests, a relic of the Dulles era of the past, may be it is possible that Americans would change their substantive policies without lowering the present level of personal cordiality towards Musharraf. [42] It is also worth mentioning that the geo-strategic priorities of Washington are no longer what they were in October 2001. Hence the combined effect of such causation might well be that Musharraf does not get the same verbal, or practical, encouragement that he has received of late. On the other hand, the political and geo-strategic goodwill and cordiality with respect to India is bound to stay what it has been since the last several decades.

There is, of course, another over riding factor recently articulated by Henry Kissinger that it would be wrong for the US to put all its eggs in the Musharraf basket as far as its policies in Pakistan are concerned. The period immediately following 9/11 was one of emergency and was an aberration from normal conduct by the US of its foreign policy agenda.

The fundamentals of US foreign policy towards Pakistan were spelled out in graphic detail by President Clinton when he visited Islamabad for four hours only on 25th April 2000. In severely reprimanding Musharraf for his misconduct in usurping the civilian authority of the state of Pakistan, he refused to even meet him in uniform or to formally greet him. In addition, because of the Musharraf factor, the US continued with the suspension of Pakistan’s military and economic assistance in place since the coup of October 1999. As compared to India, where he stayed four days, the message was loud and clear. The US had altogether a different assessment of its relations with New Delhi as compared with its view of Islamabad.

Hence, I can see that irrespective of what the General has done, the US will have to “locate an alternative” in Pakistan. The reasons articulated above would indicate that, given the nuclear status of Pakistan, it is impossible for Washington to solely rely on Musharraf. His replacement, therefore, has to be found and kept in mind during Bush's his second term. In view of what I have stated above, a Democratic incumbent of the While House would do likewise.

Hopefully, therefore, domestic politics in Pakistan and regional policies of the US do not allow that yet another military ruler emerges in Islamabad as Musharraf’s “replacement” while Washington may be searching for an “alternative” in case of need.[43] Moreover, as the sole superpower, its larger interests in this region demand that its relations between India and Pakistan remain on track in the historical context descried above. The American Government has already a high level of cordiality with Delhi. With Pakistan’s “strategic need” for the US bound to lessen soon enough, [44] and the issue of nuclear proliferation far from closed as some might wish it to be, there are fair chances, that, despite the pessimistic possibilities pointed out by me, Washington may ensure that the blossoming of tranquil relations between the two countries is not jeopardized by any “misadventures” by Islamabad’s current military rulers.

To conclude, India’s relationship with Pakistan in terms of durability, objectively speaking, is dependent on the respect and prevalence of Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in Islamabad. [45] Real questions of war and peace are better handled by representative governments as they have superior perspectives in view and interests at heart that can never be arrogated by self proclaimed protectors or by those who usurp public trust and authority. The lack of a democratic system in Pakistan is thus not only a threat to the wider strategic prospects of peace between the two major South Asian countries, it poses acute dangers to the unity and cohesion of the country itself. [46] Be that as it may, the prospect of peace now being generated by the peoples of the countries is the surest bulwark against adventurism from any side, on any pretext. In Delhi, the replacement of the BJP Government by one dominated by the Congress has had little effect on the substantive factors of the peace process. However, in history credit must be give to the BJP for having brought about a fundamental change in the public perceptions of the relations between the two neighbors.

__________________

End notes:

1 D.Phil.; B A Juris, MA. M.Litt, (Oxon), DCL (Columbia), DIA (Harvard), Of Lincoln’s Inn, Barrister at Law, UK, Attorney at Law, US, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (QC) of Pakistan; Affiliate & Visiting Professor of International Affairs, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Special UN Ambassador for Family for the World Family Alliance, Advisor to four Prime Ministers of Pakistan on Law & Foreign Affairs; Delegate to the UN, NY, & to the Human Rights Commission on Human Rights & to the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, Leader of Pakistan’s Delegation to the International Criminal Court Prep Coms., NY & Delegate to UN GA Sessions. Also, inter alia, on the Faculty of Law, Human Rights Program, Harvard University, Faculty of Political Science, Tufts University, the Secretary General, American Asian Institute of Strategic Studies, Boston. International Legal Counsel before transnational Tribunals & US Congress. David M Kennedy Scholar of International Studies, Kennedy Center, 2003-4, distinguished Visiting Professor JNU, Memorial Lecturer at Benaras Hindu University, JNU, Mumbai University &Ambadkar Center, Auranagbad, 2004-5; President, Pakistan Family Forum, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Pakistan Bar Association at Lahore, 2003/4. Given King Faisal Memorial Award, 2002 and awarded in 2003 the International Professor of Human Rights Recognition from a galaxy of international professor by Saudi Arabia

2 See The Nation, 21st March 2004.

3 See Op cit. where I say: “ No wonder in inter se comparisons with Pakistan, the highest Government functionaries of even the US have to say that “India is an emerging Power.” I do not think by this description they mean a nation with a few atomic and hydrogen bombs. They surely mean a country with a growing international clout with a settled democratic base.”

4 See ibid.

5 “Azad Kashmir” a part of the state is under Pakistan control.

6 Compared to around 3 % of Pakistan despite exaggerated claims for this purpose by Musharraf regime.

7 On 14 April in a BBC Hard Talk interview, Musharraf publicly admitted that in Pakistan the Office of the Chief of Army Staff was most important, as the Army was the most important institution of the State. Since this assertion is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, it is manifest that open pronouncements of this nature can be made (clearly amounting to a subversion of the Constitution) because instead of principles, expediency has the upper hand in the Pakistani body politic. See further a monographic work of the author: A Juridical Critique of Successful Treason, Stanford Journal of International Law, 1984, 191.

8 This author at that time was Advisor for International Affairs and Law to the Prime Minister.

9 However see Nawai-Waqt, 19 April 2004, which reproduces a Statement by Air Marshall (rtd.) Asghar Khan that both the 1965 and 1971 war with India was started by Pakistan and not India.

10 See note 4 Supra. It is astonishing that, to a major foreign journalistic organization such as the BBC, Musharraf openly admitted to this fact.

11 In early 1990when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister and then in 1999 when Nawaz Sharif held this office, newspaper reports are supportive of the perspective that such moves towards “cordiality” vis-à-vis India, were not approved by the army high command. Indeed, General Musharraf who held the highest army office in Pakistan in 1999 is reported to have refused to show the courtesy of appropriate protocol to the visiting Indian Prime Minister on his arrival at Lahore at the Wagah border.

12 See The News, &The Dawn, 26 April 2000, detailing the speech made during the Islamabad 4 hour stop over by President Clinton regarding the coup of Musharraf against the Sharif Government.

13 No such reference to Pakistan was seen by me while watching Indian daily TV news programs. Indeed, there is hardly any reference to Pakistan.

14 On the advent of the New Year, 2004, General Musharraf, went through the apparent “juridical” exercise of having the five Elected Assemblies of the Federation and the constituent Provinces repose “confidence in him to remain as “President” until 2007. He had on the previous date 31/12/03 signed into effect the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. This was to absorb his LFO (a military edict called Leal Framework Order) to gain a tailor made document through which he could feign, howsoever feebly, that he was the President of the Republic when dealing with the world community. The timing of this move was blatantly linked specially keeping in mind the SAARC conference in Islamabad between the 4th to the 6th January 2004. His initial “election” as President through the extra-constitutional Referendum that I had challenged on behalf of the major Opposition Political Parties in the Supreme Court had held this measure to be “extra-constitutional”.

15 There has never been any election to the Office of the President of Pakistan since December 1997. As such there is no doubt that factually no election has been ever held in which Musharraf got elected to any Office, let alone that of the President. Whether it is the Referendum or the purported vote of confidence or a judgment of any court, no one ever contested any such an electoral tussle.

16 See e.g. 2003 EUEOM 99 page Report on the state of “democracy” in Pakistan.

17 Represented by Benazir Bhutto, of the Pakistan People’s Party, and Nawaz Sharif, of the Pakistan Muslim League. Both have been Premiers twice each during the decade of the nineties in Pakistan. Both are in exile from Pakistan at the moment.

18 Important to note is the “voting” for the President’s Office held recently for Musharraf’s benefit. He was the only candidate to contest under the “amended” Constitution. Out of the total vote cast in the Federal Parliament; Musharraf only obtained 56% of the vote suggesting that his landslide alleged showing, 97 %, during the Referendum was entirely false. Secondly, he lost the majority vote in both the Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces. He therefore does not represent the Unity or the Symbol of the Federation, which is a constitutional requirement under Article 41of the Constitution. In the Federal Assembly he barely got the needed majority by gaining 191 voted which is one less than obtained by Prime Mister Jamali at the time of his confidence vote. Overall by proportionate calculations, the formula of which is contained in the Second Schedule of the Constitution, Musharraf only got 53.28 percent of the vote. So with all the arm- twisting, bribery and straightforward duress that the Pakistani Governments are infamous for historically for the self-perpetuation of an incumbent administration or office holder, Musharraf’s showing is abysmal.

19 Under the 17th Amendment to the Constitution enacted by Musharraf himself, he must relinquish one of the two offices he holds by 31st December 2004.

20 On 25th January 2000 Musharraf dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan and six senior most judges, all from Sindh, who had refused to take an Oath to support the Military junta. Thereafter the military government has really been interfering in the structure of judiciary: see 10 November 2004 Report of the International Crisis Group, Paris, entitled: Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan.

21 In Asma Jilani Case the Supreme Court held in 1972 that military coups amounted to a “usurpation” of the country Constitutional authority; importantly such military commanders were “usurpers”.

22 Musharraf in 2000 dismissed the Chief Justice and the six Senior Judges of the Supreme Court who refused to accept his new Oath of Allegiance to him alone. It is still quite embarrassing that Pakistan, arguably the most important Islamic nation, has, a non-elected military chief of army staff as the country’s President! On the other hand whatever may be said about India, it cannot be denied that it has elected a Muslim intellectual to be the Republic’s President.

23 See generally present author’s recent book, Pakistan: Constitutionalism Restored? 1997.

24 Testimony of March 30,1966, Foreign Assistance Act of 1966: hearings Before the committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, p 269.

25 See Brands Op cit. p 267: “The same considerations suggest that the traditional American view that it is in US interests that India and Pa

26 This has manifest relevance with regard to the nuclear status of the two major Sub-Continental states, to matters relating to nuclear proliferation and the potential position of India as an emerging regional “power”.

27 The concept of “wrong hands” remains though its “identity” has changed. At that time it was the Communist dominated north, now conceivably the “ Islamic fundamentalists” would be considered to be equally opposed to it by Washington.

28 This is quite interesting since both emerged from “British India”, one country until 1947.

29 See Brands, India, Pakistan & the Great Powers, 1972, P158.

30 India was initially quite puzzled by non-manifest US support keeping in mind the declared American position by which it considered China as a regional “threat”. However, in a major speech in Delhi on August 8, 1962 Ambassador Galbraith explained his government’s position and urged restraint lest it might worsen the cold war implications. Two former US Ambassadors to India Chester Bowles and John Sherman Cooper, despite their overt friendship with India had shared such views.

31 See Wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China, 1964

32 ibid. P 75

33 See President Johnson’s declaration that no further said would be given until India and Pakistan worked out an understanding for living more peacefully, The New York Times, September 30, 1965.

34 See Brands Op cit, p 257 where it said: “We seldom recognize one unique aspect of America’s experience in world affairs---its lack of involvement except when confronted with an acute threat to its security”.

35 This concern is based on the of repeated American pronouncements that (1) it considers it vitally important that Islamabad’s nuclear assets do not fall into “wrong hands”, (2) the internal security of Pakistan is very unpredictable, and (3) the lack of a settled political system on account of frequent military adventurism in the affairs of the State.

36 The “wana” operation started in Pakistan’s Musharraf regime against “rebellious” foreign and local elements (of the fundamentalist variety) in South Waziristan on 15th March 2004, in military terms was only a limited success. The Economist opined that though Islamabad admitted to losing around 50 solders, actually lost over 150. This first major armed action within Pakistan by its military after 1971 has opened up another wide area of concern and raised many questions that have to be comprehended and understood by the Pakistan Administration if adverse fallout to the security interests of the state has to be avoided.

37 For instance in the 3rd week of April 2004 it was officially announced in Pakistan by the relevant quarters that American use of its airbases, particularly in Sindh at Shabaz had all but been given up by the US.

38 See note 8 Supra.

39 Much stress has been laid in this respect by the Bush Administration to continue the war against “terrorism” as long as it takes. But it is doubtful if it will really be long-lasting keeping in mind the current crisis in Iraq and the rising spiral of anti-American feelings in the area.

40 See for instance the testimony of Richard Clarke, former Chief of Anti-Terrorism in the White House before the 9/11 Commission. He maintains that by going after other political targets like Iraq, “which had nothing to do with international terrorism”, already US has seemingly lost long-term interests in acting against international terrorism.

41 See, for instance, the statement of Foreign Office Spokesman of Pakistani Government in Nawai-Waqt, 25 April 2004.

42 General Musharraf complained recently in a press interview with the Washington Post that while the Administration was all for him, he felt that US media was not.

43 Some analysts like General Aslam Beg, the former Chief of Army Staff, think that that the current administrative setup of the armed forces as created by the appointments made by Musharraf are such, that such an eventuality has already been taken care of him.

44 But see the statement of Secretary of State Colin Powel on 16th March 2004 in Islamabad that because of its assistance to US in its war against terrorism, Pakistan was “ a non NATO ally.” Exactly what this means is unclear and whether such a status can be conferred without congressional approval is questionable.

45 See generally present author’s recent book, Pakistan: Constitutionalism Restored? 1997.

46 The National Security Act demanded by Musharraf was enacted into law in the Senate of Pakistan in less than three minutes in April 2004. A controversial head of state like Musharraf and a parliament that enacts such fascist type legislation which allows the four army chiefs to sit and advise and monitor civilian institutions in the country hardly augers well for the country’s “democratic credentials”. There is no gainsaying the fact that it is none of the business of the army of any country to so openly interfere in the politics of that state. It is more than likely that a serving general who has taken over the supreme authority of a state is more concerned with multifarious problems dealing with his “legitimacy” than with real and live substantive and delicate questions relating to diplomatic progress in a region.

How are blogs changing the political landscape?

Today, I received an email from Mike Lidell, the director of Online Communications for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee asking me to join in a blogger’s conference call with Senator Chuck Schumer, DSCC Chair.

In contrast, I received a bulk email from Howard Dean entitled “Investments pay off”. It asked for a $25 contribution. Rahm Emanuel, Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee sent a bulk email entitled, “Democratic Vision Wins Out” asking for a contribution. Emily’s list sent a bulk email “Insider News - Setting the stage for 2006” asking for a contribution. The bulk email from Eli Pariser of MoveOn was entitled “Good election news! Now let's win big in 2006” and asked me to donate now. Jim Dean, of Democracy for America entitled his bulk email, “...And We're Only Getting Started”. It also asked for a contribution. John Kerry’s bulk email was entitled, “Reality 2, Bush 0” and asked me to click on an online petition calling to withdraw 20,000 troops over the holidays and asking for a contribution.

I didn’t send in a check to anyone or click on any petition. However, I did spend an hour of my time listening to Senator Schumer. I’m glad I did. He spoke frankly and openly about what is going on with the DSCC. He frequently spoke about Senators being out of touch with their constituents and how he wanted to change that.

In particular, he is encouraging Democratic Senators to head home each weekend to be in their local media markets. Being on CNN or Cspan is not enough. “You can’t just issue press releases from Washington”, he said. I pressed him on the subject saying that replacing CNN and Cspan with local TV stations is still very broadcast oriented and doesn’t do a lot to get Senators to hear their constituents any better.

In response, he spoke about the importance of blogs and how the folks at DSCC are teaching Senators about blogs. He went on to say, “Here is my major message, you can’t sit in Washington and think people will listen to you.”

I hope the Senators hear that message. I hope we can move towards a more participatory democracy. It looks like Senator Schumer is trying to move us in that direction. At least I hope that is what he is trying to do.

Will blogs help open up the political process and get people a little more involved? I hope so, because the old style doesn’t work and the flood of email donation requests isn’t really doing it. Hopefully, these sort of blogger conference calls will become common place.

A New Content Supplier

Back in August, I wrote about Political Network Topologies, drawing a distinction between two models of politics, one in terms of social networks and the other in terms of citizens as consumers. Jock added a comment pointing me to the work of Anna Nagurney from Umass on supernetworks.

I listened her keynote at MeshForum 2005 and started thinking in different ways about networks. Usually, when I think about networks, I think about nodes and links. However, she points out the importance of the flow on the network as well.

Yesterday, Grant McCracken wrote about brands as a new content provider. He focuses on the ‘flow’ aspects of social networks and how this flow is essential to sustaining social networks. He goes on to suggest that brands may be an important source of ‘flow’ for social networks, thus bringing together ideas of politics as a social network and politics as a group of citizens as consumers.

Looking at grassroots political groups I’ve been involved with, this makes a lot of sense. There is an ebb and flow of political involvement based on the flow on the political social networks. Various groups, like the DNC, DFA, MoveOn, etc. have been providing a brand and content to try and keep people excited and involved.

However, this brings us back to the whole issue of network topology. The problem with brands providing content is that the network flow comes too much from a small number of sources and the flow is unidirectional. If we want to keep a social network vibrant, we need to encourage the leaf nodes to produce content and the flow to be multidirectional.

Can brands to that? Can blogs do that? It is useful to think about network flow, but we need to be careful about getting stuck in old broadcast style thinking that doesn’t utilize network flow as fully as possible.

Unleading

Over on Full Circle Online Interaction Blog, Nancy White asks, “How should we select our Keynote speakers?” She points to this blog post where Andrew observes, “Sitting in conferences I have often looked around at the audience and thought about the incredible opportunity for discovery which lies within”.

When I first read these posts, I thought of conferences I’ve been to where the keynote speaker or the panelists are sitting in front of a large screen with an online chat behind them. There have been great discussions that have taken place in such chats. Take a look at the Personal Democracy Forum Backchat for a good example.

My thought is that the best Keynote speakers, and for that matter the best leaders of any sort are likely to be those that can work well with a public backchat going on.

Is there a generational shift going on that make people more interested in a dialog with speakers and leaders? Is it a result of changes in technology? How does this fit in with the current interest in ‘framing’? Are we seeing people get tired of a father that knows best? Are people starting to question this father image?

Staying with the framing images for a moment, I’ve commented before about how the Jon Stewart comes across more as the sassy teenager challenging the father images than as a father image himself. Perhaps the same is playing out in the current brouhaha about Anderson Cooper (sassy teenager) replacing Aaron Brown (authoritative father figure).

How does this relate to the political scene? To put it back into the language of Greater Democracy, are we seeing more of a focus post-broadcast leadership where we move beyond the sound-byte back to meaningful dialog? I hope so. I hope to attend more conferences with a backchat going on and keynote speakers that can interact well with that. I hope to work for political candidates that can engage in a meaningful dialog through retail politics and through blogs. But then again, maybe I’m still just a sassy teenager.

Steele Goes After Cheney 

On his excellent site, Robert Steele has a PORTAL: Collective Intelligence

Here is his COMMENT of 3 Nov 05.

Two forces have come together in our mind in the past week, and today we acknowledge both. On the one hand, as we further our strategy of Googlizing intelligence (Google still cannot data mine, visualize, game, translate, or connect people quickly with one another and with relevant information, but that is coming), we have realized this week that the pathologies of the secret intelligence community are what enabled the pathologies of the neo-conservatives, aided by the dishonest vapidity of most Members of the Senate and the House--the Republicans cravenly took orders from the White House (Dick Cheney specifically, as President Pro Tem of the Senate), and the Democrats cravenly let themselves get steam-rolled and sold out their constituencies as the extremeist Republicans sold out their country.

Secret intelligence is for all practical purposes dead as a force for good. At this time, with the $9 billiion satellite as the poster child of classified idiocy, the US Intelligence Community is a sucking chest wound in the Executive Branch, and unlikely to be operated on in a meanigful way anytime soon. However, and we are moved with admiration for Ambassador Joseph Wilson, this week we also saw the power of truth and openness.

In our 53 years on this planet, we have never seen a more balanced, elegant, articulate, exposition of relevant truth and honor as we witnessed when Ambassador Wilson spoke to the National Press Club this week, as covered by C-SPAN. It became crystal clear that it is Dick Cheney that has betrayed all Americans, and the Republic, many many times.

While we opposed the war and spoke truth to power in the run up to the war, and we have an adequate record of intregrity and honor, Ambassador Wilson caused us to realize that we had not done enough. Today we have released the final in a series of press releases relevant to America's difficulties in the world. Today's press release is somewhat unique in that it went to US1 (all outlets everywhere), to the paid lists of senior journalists that cover the White House, the Pentagon, and Foreign Affairs, to every publisher in America, and by fax, to every Member of Congress.

This release itemizes the crimes that Cheney has committed, and calls for his resignation before Christmas. Karl Rove, while he may be a maggot, is not the real deal. It will not be enough for Congress to pretend to go after Rove, all the while protecting Cheney. Cheney has been "outed" (in more ways than one, but we won't go there). Now we get to see if the American people, and the rather lazy unimaginative "Fourth Estate" called the media, will do the job of making Cheney untenable as a sitting Vice President. If Cheney does not resign before Christmas, ideally to be replaced by John McCain, whom we would eagerly support for President in 2008, then this country can kiss good-bye to whatever hopes it might have had of suriving the multiple debacles that have enriched Cheney while gouging flesh and blood from the Republic.

It is time for all men and women of good will who care for this wonderful country called America, to stand and be counted. IOP '06 is not a money-making event, but if you want to be subtle, sign up for it, and we promise a grand surprise. It is hard, we know, to do the right thing in the face of enormous bureaucratic and professional pressure. What Ambassador Wilson did at the National Press Club was nothing short of releasing the pressure valve. It's over--Dick Cheney is history. The only question is: will America rise to the occasion? God Bless America, which is no longer represented by the likes of Dick Cheney. St.

Press Release [MS Word format].