By: Dr. Farooq Hassan

National Intelligence Director John Negroponte, the head of US spying operations says “the leaders of al-Qaeda have found a secure hideout in Pakistan from where they are rebuilding their strength.” He further said that al-Qaeda was strengthening itself across the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. He told the Senate Intelligence Committee that al-Qaeda was still the militant organization that “poses the greatest threat to US interests”. In his written statement, he admitted that despite world wide efforts of the US, terrorism was still very much in evidence in the regions where despite tremendous sacrifices Washington had even gone to war. Such a claim will be embarrassing for General Musharraf, whom Negroponte described as a key partner in America’s war on terror.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan rejected these comments, which are the most specific on the issue yet. Afghanistan has welcomed the comments. President Hamid Karzai’s chief of staff, Jawed Ludin, told the BBC that Afghanistan has long maintained the Islamic militants operate from within Pakistan and Negroponte’s “statement was refreshing in its honesty”.

But the precise accusation made by him is very interesting. Until now the US has not been so specific about where it believes al-Qaeda’s leaders are hiding. Does it indicate an inherent and subtle policy shift may be possible in this regard? A careful perusal of such a determination by the Americans is certainly not impossible. Hikmatyar’s recent admission of helping the al Qaeda leadership escape the US led onslaught on Tora Bora five years ago has to be seen in this context. Without question he remained and may be still have the support of important Pakistani leadership.

Negroponte’s statement which has been extensively carried by the American media on Friday, the 12th of January significantly added that “They are cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hide-out in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe,” he said. “We have captured or killed numerous senior al-Qaeda operatives, but al-Qaeda’s core elements are resilient. They continue to plot attacks against our homeland and other targets with the objective of inflicting mass casualties,” Negroponte added.

The unusually forthright statement by Negroponte is the first time the US has publicly singled out Pakistan, one of its key allies, as the current home of al-Qaeda’s high command. Previously, officials had spoken more vaguely about the group having bases in the mountainous border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the US spy Chief was also personally kind to General Musharraf by saying that he had indeed been instrumental in handing over key suspects of the Al-Qaeda to the US in the past. “Musharraf is our partner in the war on terror and has captured several al-Qaeda leaders. However, Pakistan remains a major source of Islamic extremism,” Negroponte’s submissions the Senate committee continued.

A clear distinction is being apparently made by the US by emphasizing that:

(1) General Musharraf remains loyal to the US interests.
(2) Pakistan, as a State continues to remain suspicious as far as the US is concerned about harboring, terrorism and its chief benefactors.

As such it is easy to understand that all the relevant Pakistani official spokesmen really asserted the role of the “country” rather than that of the current military junta in command in Islamabad. Who accepts such meaningless distinctions for a country like Pakistan is anybody’s guess. In Pakistan whatever the ruling regime wishes seems to occur. Not long ago General Musharraf said plainly that “if the people did not elect his supports, there was disaster in store for the entire country”. He clearly has in his mindset what Louis XIV had in view when he said: “Après’ mois le deluge!” There is no doubt that General has come to believe that he and Pakistan is synonymous!

A statement from Pakistan’s foreign ministry said that Islamabad had done more than any other country to break the back of al-Qaeda and that while its security forces continued to pursue remnants of the group, it was wrong to link these to al-Qaeda elements. Pakistan’s Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao also downplayed Negroponte’s comments as “too general”, saying that Pakistan responded to specific information about al-Qaeda members and claiming that the “movement was totally marginalized”.
It would see therefore that in the current mood that exists in Washington, the occurrence of a one serious mishap in the pursuit of terrorism could be the harbinger of an alteration of American foreign policy towards Pakistan. I am aware that only this week the US Ambassador to Pakistan said that democracy was Pakistan’s “internal affair”, but I doubt if that is really Washington’s stated objective or a fundamental ingredient of is foreign policy. The tragic rise and fall of Saddam until his disgraceful death is the latest illustration of this point. Until he served the interests of the powers that may be, he remained “acceptable”. People still remember vividly photos of people of the level of Rumsfeld standing in attention in honor of the now defamed dictator! However, how the scenario changed leading to his ultimate downfall was predicated by the avowed accomplishment of a pursuit of “democracy” in Iraq.

So clearly with terrorism now being placed at Musharraf’s door steps, the moment of truth for the General might be nearer than he thinks. With the change of key army personal in Central Command in the US military, Musharraf has to re-convince everyone of has continued loyalty and obedience. How he does so if the accusing finger is pointed towards Pakistan itself and not to him remains to be seen.

He also has the task of convincing he new spy master of the US about his bona fides. President George W Bush last week named retired Navy Vice Admiral Michael McConnell as the new US national intelligence director. Negroponte took charge of the 16 US intelligence agencies in April 2005, but is shortly due to move to the state department where he will become Condoleezza Rice’s deputy. Would that mean that even in the State Department Pakistan and or the General may have critical times ahead? It seems to me that both in the Pentagon and the State departments Pakistan had, relatively, speaking an easier time. Now with intelligence services opining otherwise about the activities of the Islamic hardliners or activists, there is the possibility of newer attitude in the US foreign policy towards Islamabad.

While talking of terrorism and Pakistan a word may be helpful about the current activities regarding hostilities in Afghanistan. Recently the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt-Gen Michael Maples, said Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan remained a haven for al-Qaeda and other militants. He was of the view that the tribal areas on the border are thought to be where al-Qaeda leader Bin Laden and his deputy Zawahiri could be hiding. He admitted that Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 1,400-mile (2,250km) mountainous border which is extremely difficult to patrol. Taleban and al-Qaeda fighters are thought to be operating on both sides.

But the buck stops when this is realized that Afghanistan remains within the territorial military control of the Americans. Where they cannot do much except sophisticated guess work in addition to electronic espionage, is to conclude that the real perpetrators have to be there within the Frontier Province of Pakistan.
Two points of interest are however with which we can conclude:

(1) Kabul particularly opposes the Pakistani idea of mining stretches of the frontier, saying it will endanger civilian lives. Pakistan has reiterated its intention to fence and mine sections of the troubled border. No one in the world that matters, such as he EU, or UK or even the US including Afghanistan accept this measure which is considered by them to be dangerous and self serving mechanism devised by the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan.

(2) An Islamist insurgency spearheaded by the resurgent Taliban militia is at its strongest in the southern Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan. Presently an objective overview will compel one to conclude that except for Kabul most of the southern regions have already passed back to the resurgent Taliban.
These fundamentals stem from a proper understanding of the conceptual problem at hand.

Finally a word about history is necessary. Not only the Americans are not familiar with this phenomenon, it is clear that even Pakistan’s General Musharraf seems to be oblivious to these nuances that emanate from such a historical reality.

It is over 250 years since Afghanistan was cobbled together, from many ethnic groups, and two centuries since British colonisers tried unsuccessfully at stretching their writ to India’s (now Pakistan’s) north-western frontier, where the plains crumple up towards the Hindu Kush. Yet, in both places, a large part of the population is still wedded to Pushtunwali. Some 15m Pushtuns live in Afghanistan, or 50% of its population; and 28m in Pakistan, mostly in NWFP, representing about 15% of the local population there. Most of them are still ruled by their tribal codes, the notable exception or addition being where the rival Islamist teachings, including some of the stringent Saudi variety which is preached by the Taliban are strong and followed.
Islamism has rivaled Pushtunwali for centuries; it has often gained prominence, as currently, in times of war. More typically, the two competing ways have cross-fertilized in both in Afghanistan and North West Pakistan, each subtly influencing the other. Whatever the device that Musharraf comes up to finish either Al Qaeda or Taliban with, until this basic fact of the demographics and peoples dynamics is perceived in totality, it is very difficult to realize what he wants to accomplish for what Qazi Hussain Ahmed calls, are his “external masters”.

General Musharraf’s basic inability to fathom such matters is that he is not, in American constitutional terms, a son of the soil since he only migrated from Delhi to Pakistan after the country had been created. This cultural gulf apparently still stands to disable him from comprehending the human strength of the local elements and forces at work in this area and domain. Except for DeGaule or Eisenhower military generals are not good at understanding the realities of an adversary historical legacy that may confront them some day. Even the British, the greatest recent imperial power to exist in recent history in this part of the world, learnt this to its chagrin in Afghanistan when it foolishly fought two Afghan wars in 1841 and 1842.
It is one thing to be a good general or to assume unlawful power in a country such as Pakistan. Is an altogether different matter to do well as a statesman?

Dr. Farooq Hassan, D.Phil.;
BA (Juris),MA,M. LiTT (OXON);
DCL (Columbia),DIA(Harvard);
Sen.Adv.Sup.Ct. (Pakistan),
Barrister at Law (UK),Attorney at Law(US).

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